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This article examines how occupying forces deploy exceptional means to reconstruct 
contested territories so as to normalize and in thus way fortify their presence. Analyzing two 
case studies—the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights and the Turkish occupation of 
Northern Cyprus—I show that the objective of the normalization process has in each case 
been different. Israel normalized its presence in the Golan in order to incorporate this region 
into its own territory, while Turkey has been normalizing its presence in Northern Cyprus in 
order to craft it as Turkish without fully integrating it into its own body politic. However, and 
despite these differences, a similar rationale has in both cases led the core states—Israel and 
Turkey— to employ a twofold normalization strategy during the conquest and subsequent 
occupation.  
On the one hand, the core states accentuated the geostrategic risks (real or 
constructed) embodied in the territories captured and presented them as constituting a threat 
that could be dealt with only through the imposition of a state of emergency and the 
deployment of exceptional means (e.g., ethnic cleansing, widespread destruction).  On the 
other hand, and simultaneously, the core states strove to transform these contested spaces and 
reproduce them as normal in order to render them non-threatening.  
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In other words, the core states present the spaces they had occupied as both an 
exception (a threat that needs to be controlled and managed) and simultaneously as normal. 
Examining how the strategies employed by the occupying states are informed by this tension, 
I show that the incongruity cannot be fully managed.  The fact that these territories are 
colonized and are therefore constituted as spaces of exception is ultimately re-exposed. 
Following a brief literature review and after justifying the comparison between the 
two cases, I analyze the impact of ethnic cleansing, destruction and reconstruction on how the 
occupied spaces were reproduced following the military conquests. I maintain that the 
practices used during the occupation constituted the space as a form of encampment that is 
bent on shaping each territory as a space of exception. I examine the strategies deployed to 
normalize the colonized spaces, emphasizing the important role of constituting the threat as 
external, while showing how various practices, such as tourism, have been deployed to 
produce a sense of normalcy. These normalization efforts should be conceived as a 
domestication strategy aimed at mitigating the spatial ramifications of transforming the 
territory into an encampment. By way of conclusion, the conceptual and spatial 
codependency of exception and norm within the framework of contemporary colonial 
conquests is revisited. 
 
Spaces of Exception, Encampment and Domestication 
The state of exception has engendered considerable interest among geographers and critical 
theorists. Originally employed by Carl Schmitt in his critique of liberal regimes (1988), it has 
been discussed extensively both as a theoretical framework and as a paradigm for empirical 
research. Most of the scholarly literature concerned with this subject also invokes Giorgio 
Agamben’s (1995) analysis of the concentration camp as a point of departure.  Deploying the 
concept of homo sacer (sacred man or the accursed man), Agamben claimed that upon 
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entering the camp a person's life can be taken without committing homicide. But, following 
Michel Foucault (1984), he argued that the biopolitics of the camp are oriented toward 
preservation of the inmate's life on the brink of death (Agamben, 1995: 28–29). Whether a 
Nazi extermination facility, a Soviet Gulag or a humanitarian relief center for refugees, the 
camp is a space wherein Schmitt's separation between norm and exception enters a zone of 
in-distinction as law and violence are no longer discernable from one another (Agamben, 
2000: 40.1; Diken & Laustsen, 2005; Ek, 2006).  
The scholarship on the space of exception has underscored the ways in which various 
localities can be encamped, which alludes to the dynamic in which spaces are shaped into an 
Agambenian camp through the application of various means of sovereign violence.  In other 
words, encampment is the process through which a given space becomes a space of exception 
through different practices such as bordering (Sparke, 2006; Amoore, 2006; Epstein, 2007), 
systematic annihilation (Gregory, 2004), neglect (Shewly, 2013), or by being heir to a 
broader conflict (Boano & Martén, 2013). Encamped spaces can be formed as interstate 
frontiers (Hagman & Korf, 2012), borderlands (Jones, 2009a) and enclaves (Jones, 2009b; 
Shewly, 2013) or urban localities (Schinkel & Van De Berg, 2011). In this sense we can 
understand the space of exception, not as a concrete location but as an ever-changing site 
which materializes through an "unlocalizable process of transformation" (Belcher, Martin, 
Secor, Simon & Wilson, 2008: 599).   
Current literature on encampment processes, criticizes the way in which the space of 
exception has been perceived and presented as a site where sovereign force is total and no 
resistance is possible (Jones, 2012), and accordingly points to the various conceptualizations 
of political agency that can be formed within spaces of exception (Ramadan, 2012).  As 
Derek Gregory suggests in his examination of the military internment compound at 
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Guantanamo Bay (2006), the space of exception is characterized by political subjectivity that 
may be (productively) shaped as well as repressed.1   
The underlying theoretical claim in this literature is that the exception can produce 
new and unpredictable norms. Stuart Elden (2007), for instance, shows how paramilitary 
training camps can be reshaped into sites of resistance that subvert conceptualizations of 
territorial sovereignty and integrity. Another notable example concerns Palestinian refugee 
camps, which have languished in a state of temporariness for over 60 years and have been a 
frequent target for the exertion of extrajudicial violence (Ramadan, 2009a). These camps, 
however, also serve as sites for the forging national identity (Hanafi, 2008) and collective 
memory (Collins, 2011; Ramadan, 2009b; 2012), and bear the potential to proffer embattled 
inhabitants forms of autonomous governance beyond the supervision of the sovereign 
(Szanto, 2012).  Similarly, an encamped urban sphere can become a space of defiance and 
subversion where norms are challenged and social and political protests unleashed (Ramadan, 
2013).   
Thus, encampment does not necessarily entail merely the suspension of the norm, 
since at times it can end up producing in unexpected and unintentional ways novel and even 
transgressive norms. As Benedikt Korf (2006) shows the practices used in the production of a 
space of exception can be (and, at times, are) applied to facilitate the realization of a 
particular utopian vision. Thus, spaces of exception may be reshaped as purified ideal places 
in accordance with the aims, intentions, and visions of those able to wield sovereign power 
(Giaccaria & Minca, 2011). 
Spatial encampments have also been a focal point of research that does not 
necessarily engage with the conceptual framework of the state of exception. There is a 
developing body of literature that gauges the convoluted ways in which various colonial sites 
have undergone some form of normalization (Shigematsu and Camacho, 2010).  One 
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germane example pertains to the scholarly work analyzing the way the United States formed 
various sites in parts of the Pacific and Asia (Gillem, 2007), such as Guam (Herman, 2008), 
Pearl Harbor (Osorio, 2010), Bikini Atoll (Davis, 2005) and the Clark Special Economic 
Zone in the Philippines (Gonzales, 2007). 
   
Such works examine the economic, social, and cultural effects as well as colonial 
legacies of America's different encampments by investigating issues such as gender relations, 
ecology, architecture, memory and tourism, and reviewing what Lutz (2006) calls the 
topography of U.S power and how it produces various forms of militarized landscapes.2   
According to Lutz (2006: 595), since contemporary colonial and imperial projects 
constantly work to disguise themselves there is a need to closely scrutinize how these projects 
are produced – cases, which Michael Lujan Bevacqua argues, represent a form of "colonial 
banality that  continues to evade even the sharpest critical eyes" (Bevacqua, 2010: 33).  
Thus, the dynamics through which the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus were 
shaped as domesticated encampments are not unique. Similar processes can be identified in 
other colonial settings in North America, the Pacific, the Balkans or the Middle East. The 
analysis of the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus domestication process contributes to our 
general understanding of how similar spaces of exception which were shaped as normal sites 
are constructed and deconstructed.  
 More specifically, building on the insights of the body of literature that discusses 
how contested colonial sites are normalized, the aim of this article is to examine how the 
Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus can improve our understanding of the processes in which 
exceptional encampments are normalized.  Concentrating on the co-existence (rather than 
replacement) of exception and norm, in the following pages I analyze the way in which the 
exception is intentionally used in order to spatially construct the norm through a process of 
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domestication.  Domestication denotes a situation whereby the state of emergency which 
provided the main reasoning for the occupation and subsequent sovereign control is not 
negated, but rather rearticulated and redeployed in order to reshape the space and transform it 
so that it is concomitantly both threatening and normal.  
I also show how in both the Golan and Northern Cyprus two distinct practices—
ethnic cleansing and spatial demolition—became part of the overall process in which the 
occupied territory was encamped and later domesticated so as to constitute the contested 
space as normal. Consequently, two interconnected processes are examined here. I begin by 
describing how the state of exception was produced and employed to garner legitimization 
and support and then show that it was used spatially to reproduce the contested space in order 
to domesticate it. The duality of the practices used to shape space in order to rationalize the 
ongoing presence of the occupying state and reconcile apparent incongruities as well as the 
tensions and contradictions that ultimately re-expose the state of exception is the main 
interest of this article. 
 
The case studies 
The two case studies are notably distinct in regard to their historical trajectory, social context 
and geographical setting - and not surprisingly have never been dealt with together or 
compared. There is an abundant literature dealing with Turkey and Northern Cyprus ranging 
from analytical chronologies of the occupation to studies of the inherent problems of the 
Cypriot state, which foreshadowed the 1974 Turkish invasion. Some investigations into the 
framework of the state of exception also discuss the way in which it produces rather than 
represses political agency (Constantinou, 2008; Bryant & Hatay, 2011). There are also 
comparative examinations that have been utilized to assess the Northern Cypriot status as an 
unrecognized state (Ronnen, 2010; Isachenko, 2012), as well as ethnographic introspections 
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on the convoluted ways in which it has been constructed as a polity (Papadakis, 2005; 
Navaro-Yashin, 2003; 2012). 
Scholarly work on the Golan tends to be less critical. Most research has focused on its 
geostrategic advantages (Shalev, 1995), military history (Mayzel, 2001; Zisser, 2002), 
historical development as a contested region (Muslih, 1999; Efrat, 2009) and Israel's effort to 
colonize it (Harris, 1980; Davis, 1983; Kipnis, 2009). Critical investigation of the 
normalization of the Golan remains strikingly underdeveloped, and tends to regard the 
occupation of the territory as a mere "side effect" or epiphenomenon of the June 1967 war 
(Oren, 2002; Gorenberg, 2006; Segev, 2007).  
Notwithstanding the differences between the case studies, two common denominators 
enable a fruitful comparison. First, both territories were occupied by military force and 
subsequently colonized by a core state.  Each space was connected to the occupying state yet 
remained, through various practices, detached and excluded.  Second, in each case the 
principal justification for occupation – the ostensible threat of the territory in question – 
belies an inherent contradiction within the overt recasting of the occupiers’ presence as 
normal.  By laying bare these two common denominators and how they operate I contribute 
to the discussion about the ways in which modern forms of occupation are in fact imbued in a 
colonial state of mind (Gregory, 2004; Khalili, 2008; Shenhav and Berda, 2009).  
 
Constructing geopolitical emergencies 
With an area of 1,500 square kilometers, the Golan Heights is situated where Israel, Lebanon, 
Syria, and Jordan meet. Despite Zionist territorial claims, the territory was placed under 
French custodianship and subsequently Syrian rule when that state was established in 1946. 
In the aftermath of the 1948 war, the Syrian-Israeli armistice (July 1949) placed the Golan 
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Heights outside Israel's recognized sovereign territory, officially demarcating it as part of 
Syria (Biger, 2001: 135-187).  
Despite the armistice agreement, ensuing border skirmishes revolved around three 
core issues: sovereignty over several disputed enclaves; disputed water resources; and alleged 
Syrian assistance to Palestinian combatants attempting to infiltrate Israel.  Both Israel and 
Syria used military force to advance their interests wringing casualties, damage, and anxiety 
on both sides (Muslih, 1999: 4-20, 23-45).  Significantly, ongoing clashes resulted in an 
intensified militarization of the area which Israel almost always referred to as the "Syrian 
plateau".  
In reality, apart from limited incursions into Israel and artillery fire on the latter's 
settlements, Syria restricted its warfare to vehement propaganda broadcasts from Damascus 
(Zisser, 2002: 186). Nonetheless, the border clashes were conceived in Israel as a threat and 
served as one of the catalysts for the Six-Day War of June 1967 (Oren, 2002: 42-49). There 
was substantial public pressure in Israel, as well as strong demands from the military, that the 
Syrian plateau be captured. The invasion finally began on June 8th and within two days, 1,250 
square km of the plateau were occupied by the Israeli military (Oren, 2002: 261, 300-302). 
 
Map 1: Areas occupied by Israel in the 1967 war including the Golan  (Source: Peace 
Now).  
Cyprus was important within the Turkish national security discourse for three major 
reasons. First, the island had been under Ottoman rule from 1571 till 1878, when it was 
transferred to British authority. Though Turkey abrogated any claims to sovereignty over the 
island in 1923, Cyprus continued to occupy an important place in Turkey's national narrative 
as a territory ceded by the Ottoman Empire (Uzer, 2011: 124). Second, the island’s proximity 
to the shores of Anatolia rendered it a potential strategic threat due to the demand of a 
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majority of Cypriots for unification with Greece, Turkeys' traditional rival (Bilgin, 2007; 
752). Third, the wellbeing of the Turkish Cypriot minority was considered a national concern 
in Turkey (Nevzat, 2005).  
After Cyprus gained independence in 1960, Greek Cypriots were dissatisfied with the 
degree of political power given to the island’s Turkish minority and enshrined in the 
constitution. Strained since the 1930s, inter-communal relations rapidly deteriorated (Salem, 
1992: 120) and in December 1963, violent clashes quickly spiraled into open civil war. By 
August, 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots had been killed (Patrick, 1976: 53).  
Most of the 100,000 Turkish Cypriots were moved to 42 territorial enclaves covering 
approximately 1.6 percent of the island’s territory   (Kliot & Mansfeld, 1997: 501-502).  
In practical terms, relocating into enclaves meant that Turkish Cypriots would be 
excluded from state institutions and dwell under a state of siege. While this state of 
emergency also became a moment of opportunity to practice autonomous self-government 
and to fashion a more distinct Turkish Cypriot identity (Bryant & Hatay, 2011), this 
embattled independence was paradoxically predicated on dependence upon Turkey, which 
provided Turkish Cypriots annually with 25 million dollars (Kliot & Mansfeld, 1997: 502); 
delivered relief aid to 56,000 Turkish Cypriots (Boroweic, 2000: 65); and provided military 
training and support (Dodd, 2010: 67). This relationship framed Turkey as an external agency 
intermittently intervening through supervision and occasional force.  
Concurrently, as hostilities on the island had eased considerably the Greek Cypriot 
political leadership was becoming disenchanted with the idea of unification with Greece, 
particularly since the coup by a military junta there in 1967. Displeased with the Greek 
Cypriots’ newly found antipathy, Athens staged a military coup in Cyprus on July 15th 1974. 
The Greek junta appointed Nikos Sampson, a notorious Greek Cypriot militia fighter – who 
in the 1960s openly propagated a plan of ethnic cleansing against the Turkish minority – as 
10 
 
president and he immediately proclaimed that a full unification with Greece was imminent 
(Hitchens, 1997).  
Together with Greece and Britain, Turkey had been granted guarantor rights allowing it 
to use militarily means if Cyprus' constitution were compromised. Since the 1960s, Turkish 
public sentiment had encouraged armed intervention in Cyprus (Bahcheli,1992: 68), bolstered 
by demands of the Turkish military – which had by that time already forcibly removed two 
elected governments in Ankara in May 1960 and March 1971 (Adamson, 2001).3 Turkey was 
also experiencing severe internal unrest as radical left movements and extreme right militias 
violently clashed in the streets throughout period under discussion (Nye, 1977). Hence, the 
state of emergency in Cyprus correlated with internal emergencies in Turkey, and although 
the crisis of 1974 was largely confined to Greek Cypriot areas, Turkey invaded the island on 
July 20th (Adamson, 2001: 278). The military intervention in Cyprus was presented as an 
attempt to prevent a state of emergency for Turkish Cypriots, under the pretext of Turkey's 
role as guarantor. Within a month, Turkey had occupied a third of Cyprus, literally creating a 
new state on the island.  
 
Map 2: The partition of Cyprus  (Source: University of Texas Libraries). 
Notably, in both the Israeli and Turkish cases, areas distinctively external to the state's 
sovereign territory had come to represent a space whose occupation was vital to thwart 
danger and prevent an emergency. As one popular Hebrew song referred to it, the conquest of 
the Syrian plateau was a victory over the "mountain that turned into a monster" (Kipnis 
2009).  Similarly, as news of the invasion spread, the Turkish public reacted with delight for 
the operation "had brought a sense of national unity to the country, which cut across political, 
economic, and social lines" (Adamson, 2001: 289-90).  
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Thus, more than anything else, the occupation was understood to be part of an expansion 
strategy propelled by the perception (mostly constructed) of a concrete menace. This also 
meant that subsequent actions of control and appropriation in the newly occupied territory 
would have to be rationalized as necessary in order to quell the potential resurgence of an 
emergency situation. Consequently, both occupied areas underwent a process of encampment 
which was based on two related tactics: population removal and spatial devastation.  
 
 
Encampment  
Since Israel considered the Syrian plateau a strategic location to be pacified at all costs, it 
decided to reshape the area, first by expelling the indigenous population and preventing their 
return (Harris, 1978; Ram 2013), and later by destroying their built environment. The Syrian 
plateau was thereby emptied of its indigenous residents through the application of sovereign 
violence including expulsion.  According to a UN report compiled following the war, the 
Israeli military used scare tactics, such as shooting and bombing in the vicinity of villages in 
order to hasten the departure of civilians fleeing hostilities (Harris, 1978; 1980; Davis, 1983; 
Murphy & Gannon, 2008).  
Those caught attempting to return to their villages were brought before a military 
tribunal and deported (IDFA, 1967a; 1968). Such deportations were not based upon Israeli 
civilian law but rather emergency regulations that bestowed extrajudicial powers upon the 
military (Fogelman, 2010). The strategy was  fully executed. In 1966, the local population 
had been 147,613, with an additional 15,000 Palestinian refugees of the 1948 war (Abu 
Fakhr, 2000: 5-36). Two months after the occupation, an Israeli census  enumerated 6,404 
residents in the area occupied by Israel (IDFA, 1967b; ISA,  1967 a).   
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This population depletion was exceptional compared with other territories Israel had 
occupied during the war in which less than 25 percent of the population in the West Bank, 
Gaza Strip and Sinai had been expelled. The sheer scope of the Syrian population depletion 
was crucial for the normalization process that Israel initiated after the war (Harris, 1978: 312-
315).  Israel's efforts to normalize its control over the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza Strip 
eventually failed precisely due to its inherent inability to govern large populations under a 
prolonged state of occupation and colonization (Gordon, 2008). In the Syrian plateau, by 
contrast, Israel hardly needed to govern a local population.  
The population removal was accompanied with another practice oriented toward the 
Golan's built environment which also contributed to the Golan as an encamped space. The 
Israeli military systematically demolished villages, farms, and houses. Of the 139 agricultural 
villages and 61 individual farms registered prior to the war, only seven villages were listed in 
official Israeli records by August 1967 (IDFA, 1967b). Security considerations were invoked 
in order to justify the destruction of abandoned villages as vital to prevent their structures 
from serving as hideouts for terrorists (Shai, 2006: 101), thus relating the need to perform the 
act of destruction to the broader risk emanating from Syrian retaliation by military raids or 
infiltrators.  Thus the overall demolition was based on the designation of the Syrian Plateau 
as a territory which posed a distinct threat.  
Along similar lines, Northern Cyprus could be normalized as a Turkish polity mainly 
because about 160,000 Greek Cypriots were removed from the northern part of the island by 
various acts of violence including displacement, systematic rape and random shooting into 
civilian populations (ECHR, 1978). After the war subsided, approximately 20,000 Greek 
Cypriots (of 180,000) remained in territories which had been occupied by the Turkish 
military (Gürel & Özersay, 2006). They were enclosed in schools, churches and hotels, or 
were placed under curfew within their own villages (ECHR, 1978, 139).4  Not unlike the 
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occupation of the Syrian plateau, the encampment of Cyprus was simultaneously directed 
towards the population and its built environment. The Turkish military engaged in massive 
destruction and damage of icons, murals and other sanctified objects, as well as wide scale 
looting and pillaging of churches, hotels and museums (Kliot & Mansfeld, 1997: 511).  
 Systematized and unrestricted destruction of homes, theft of possessions and arson, 
exceeding any plausible military necessity, are common encampment practices (Graham, 
2005; Campbell, Monk, & Graham, 2007; Ramadan, 2009) and were performed in both cases 
described here.   Similarly and in the context of the overall encampment process of the Golan 
and Northern Cyprus, the destruction of space, together with the removal of the population, 
also created the conditions for re-reproducing the space as normal and ostensibly 
uncontested. In other words, the specifics of these particular encampments, which were 
employed and justified on the basis of the prior designation of each territory as a site that 
poses a threat, also enabled to spatially reshape it in order to normalize the occupation.  
 
Domestication 
After the Golan's occupation, officials from Israel's Ministry of Agriculture and the Jewish 
Agency explained that "the needs of [Israeli] society and security compel a razing to the 
ground of this place". Existing structures were deemed unsuitable for a "modern Jewish 
population" (Shai, 2006: 176; ISA, 1968a; Harris, 1978: 64). Hence social well-being was 
achievable only through the complete destruction of the threatening space. 
 In the weeks after the war, several teams of Israeli experts were dispatched to the 
plateau in order to evaluate its potential. Civil engineers, rural planners, veterinarians, 
agronomists, agricultural advisors, hydrologists, and land preservation and drainage engineers 
toured the area, gathering information to enable maximal utilization of the territory (ISA, 
1967b; 1967c). Archeologists and civilian planners were divided into teams and compiled a 
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list of abandoned villages designated for preservation. The criteria for preservation were 
defined as a site’s "archaeological, historical, and touristic values" (ISA, 1967d; 1968b).  
There was a distinct colonial undertone in this discursive shift. The Golan remained 
an enemy territory but it also became a site that should be reshaped in order to be more 
suitable for modern forms of habitation. This shift – from the conceptualization of the area as 
a conflict zone to a civilian region in need of modernization – served to defuse the overt 
political and military relevance of Israel’s actions and spurred reconstruction of the territory 
into a localizable frontier region to be incorporated into the state. As one Israeli newspaper 
proudly announced to its readers in August 1968: "The Syrian Plateau [sic] has become the 
Golan Heights" (Landau, 1968).  
Likewise, Turkey also sent various experts to evaluate the potential of Northern 
Cyprus to support several economic enterprises, and invested in irrigation, afforestation and 
agricultural schemes (Inanç, 2010). Under Turkey's supervision, Northern Cyprus was 
fashioned as a distinct governable polity thorough the construction of road works, water 
utilities, and various other infrastructure projects (Moravidi, 1993a). Turkey also sent 
archeologists to examine sites considered symbolically important (Jansen, 2005). The 
domestication of Northern Cyprus was thus carried out by different state bodies but with 
results similar to those in Israel – space was reshaped so it could be governed. Thus, the 
widespread ethnic cleansing and demolitions created the necessary conditions for 
domestication. 
The Turkish domestication process in Northern Cyprus adopted features of an 
acculturation project aimed in this case at transforming the occupied Cypriot space into a 
Turkish colony. One particularly visible practice was the conversion of 59 churches, chapels 
and monasteries into mosques (Ioannides, 1991: 179). Turkey also arranged for about 70 
imams to be sent to Cyprus and preside over religious services (Moravidi, 1993b: 269).  The 
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decision to convert churches was paradoxical, the modern Turkish state rejected religiosity as 
the principal component of Turkish identity. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot population 
was  distinctly non-religious (Hatay & Nevzat, 2011). Yet when juxtaposed to the 
displacement of Greek Cypriots, it became an effective form of signification of the occupied 
territory as Turkish.  
The second practice used in order to craft Northern Cyprus as Turkish was the 
extensive renaming of settlements. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriot villages were given 
monikers that carried Turkish names with more "authentic" elements (Navaro Yashin, 2007: 
127-145).  The renaming campaign incorporated both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
villages so they could become more "authentically" Turkish, which highlighted the growing 
differences between local Turkish Cypriots and the occupying force. It was conducted in 
cooperation with the Turkish military and this stressed yet again the ways in which the 
domestication process was based on the same agents that had propagated the conquest and 
occupation (Navaro-Yashin, 2006; Navaro-Yashin, 2010: 127-143).  
Achile Mbembe has argued that a state of exception has a tendency to become the 
norm [in colonial settings]. A colonial occupation is a matter of seizing, delimiting, and 
asserting control over a physical geographical area – of writing a new set of social and spatial 
relations on the ground. His contention is that colonial warfare is not subject to legal and 
institutional rules. At the same time the territory is construed not as enemy land but as a 
vacant, and unspoiled land that can be explored and eventually exploited (Mbembe, 2003:  
25). In both the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus the encampment process was 
domesticated by converging two distinct strategies.  On the one hand, the implementation of 
an encampment process entailed the application of violence aimed at cleansing the space of 
its original population to create the necessary conditions for reshaping the space. On the other 
hand, "cleansing the space" by physical demolition served as the necessary condition for 
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domestication and was carried out initially by governmental practices such as exploration, 
assessment, analysis, and quantification.5 This dual dynamic of encampment of space and 
domestication of the state of emergency literally laid the ground for a new formation, 
producing in the Israeli case the Golan Heights and in the Turkish one, Northern Cyprus as 
distinct political units.   
The context of each occupation led to striking differences between the domestication 
processes and the difficulties they encountered. Turkey was disinclined to assume formal 
authority over the territory it occupied: its invasion was justified as intervention in favor of 
the local Turkish Cypriot population.  Northern Cyprus was refashioned as a state apparatus 
and in 1983 unilaterally declared its own independence (Dodd, 1993a; 1993b). At the same 
time, Turkey maintained direct authority over the administration and as a result on the entire 
space of the Turkish Cypriot polity.6 
  Israel, on the other hand, argued that when the Syrian plateau was occupied there 
existed an "absence… of even the slightest sign of governmental or legal arrangements" 
(Levi, 1982: 104). The assertion that the Golan had been "lawless" served to conceal the very 
dynamic that had brought about its transformation into a space with no trace of rules. 
Nevertheless, the claim regarding the lack of norms, regulation and any legal documentation 
enabled Israel to justify the application of its laws almost instantly after it was occupied 
(Gordon, 2008: 4-5).7  
Another notable difference between Israel and Turkey was the difficulties each state 
encountered when attempting to resettle the space. The Golan was presented as a strategic 
stronghold and its colonization was primarily justified by security concerns, rather than a 
Jewish return to an ancient homeland, as had been in the case of the West Bank. The 
settlements were widely dispersed throughout the territory, in keeping with military logic. 
Predictions of 50,000 Jewish settlers by 1979 were over optimistic; there are currently only 
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20,000 Jews on the Golan, compared with over 500,000 now living in the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem (Harris, 1980: 59-105; Kipnis, 2009; Gordon & Cohen, 2012).  
Turkey also invested considerable efforts to promote the colonization of the territory 
it had occupied. In 1975, the state initiated the resettlement of peasants from regions around 
the Black Sea, Central Anatolia and southeastern Turkey into Northern Cyprus. They were 
entrusted with taking care of abandoned property and confiscated land but were not granted 
the property rights (Hatay, 2005: 11; Hitchens, 1997: 106; Ioannides, 1991: 5). The denial of 
property deeds, together with the harsh, arid climate, led many settlers to return to Turkey 
with no more than 15,000 remaining in Cyprus (Hatay, 2005).  
Alternative manifestations of Turkish colonization were in the form of cheap labor 
migration. More than 130,000 workers throughout the 1990s and early 2000s relocated to 
Northern Cyprus, and about 70,000 stayed as Turkish nationals while almost 60,000 
naturalized as Turkish Cypriot citizens (Hatay, 2007).  However, concerted efforts to 
colonize the territory triggered widespread antagonism among Turkish Cypriots towards the 
Turkish settlers, immigrants and soldiers, whose behavior was regarded as a threat to local 
cultural and social identity (Lacher & Kaymak, 2005; Navaro-Yashin, 2006; Hatay, 2009; 
Loizides, 2011).   
One witnesses that each colonization attempt brought forth different difficulties that 
were related to the overall efforts to domesticate an area also considered to be a space 
external to the territory of the occupying state.  In a sense, the efforts to domesticate the 
spaces served to re-politicize and re-securitize the discourse about these contested spaces. In 
the case of the Golan Heights, it was bent on integrating the occupied area into Israel and in 
the case of Northern Cyprus to craft it as a Turkish Territory. In both however, the rationality 
remained similar, to domesticate the encampment. The effort was mainly concentrated on 
curtailing the ascribed threat that each territory ostensibly posed. At the same time, this threat 
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had to be preserved in order to justify the occupation. This situation created an inherent 
tension that became particularly evident through the spatial effects of the encampment 
process and the ways in which the state of exception constantly resurfaces.  
 
 
The encampment resurfaces 
As described above, the movement of settlers into the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus 
encountered various difficulties. However, Israel and Turkey carried out a significantly more 
successful form of normalization by construing the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus as 
tourist destinations for the citizens of each occupying state.   
Importantly, enough, the role of tourism in normalization process of contested and 
colonized spaces is not unique. As Vernadette Gonzalez shows (2013) tourism is often used 
in order to normalize colonial encampments that are occupied by military force. Tourism, she 
claims, can help to justify militarism, while the latter becomes a platform through which 
tourism is sustained.   
Indeed, tourism also played a vital role in the domestication process of Northern 
Cyprus and the Golan Heights from the initial moments of the occupation. Immediately 
following the occupation responsibility for managing most of Northern Cyprus's tourist 
industry was transferred to Turkish Cypriots,  including 50 percent of all entertainment 
facilities, 82 percent of all accommodations, and 96 percent of new hotels under construction 
(Alipour & Kilic, 2005: 83).  Nevertheless, the lack of an organized planning strategy and the 
international embargo imposed on the north seriously obstructed the ability to develop a 
tourist industry which could compete with its successful Greek Cypriot counterpart. Instead, 
Northern Cyprus became popular as a destination for visitors from Turkey (Martin, 1993: 
323).   
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Much like other cases of domesticated encampments (Davis, 2005), the wholesale 
ethnic cleansing of the 1970s enabled the Turkish Cypriot authorities to brand the territory as 
a space unspoiled by human development (Lockhart, 1994: 370).   In 1974, 70,000 mostly 
Turkish tourists visited Northern Cyprus, swelling to nearly 300,000 in 1990 (Olgun, 1993b: 
318; 323). Currently, visitors from Turkey make up about 80 percent of all tourist arrivals 
(Alipour & Kilic, 2005; Hatay, 2007). Importantly, Northern Cyprus was never officially 
designated by Turkey as a foreign destination, thereby allowing its citizens to skirt state 
limitations prohibiting more than one annual trip abroad (Lockhart, 1994: 380), thereby 
creating the impression that Northern Cyprus is part of the national territory of the Turkish 
state. 
Rebecca Stein argues that military conquests and tourism operate in similar ways 
because both entail encounters with "strange" landscapes and people (2008: 647). 
Accordingly, tourism was used to make Northern Cyprus familiar to the citizenry in the core 
state, which is crucial for the normalization process. Yet, like other former encampments 
(Teaiwa, 1994) the construction of the area as a tourist hub was paradoxical. On the one 
hand, tourism became an important practice that enabled normalization of the occupation by 
transforming the encamped space into a leisure site rather than a warzone. On the other hand, 
this transformation cannot completely cover up the physical evidence of the military 
encampment. 
One example of how the military encampment resurfaces can be found in Famagusta, 
Northern Cyprus' second largest urban center, located on the eastern coast. Tourists who visit 
the city often go to the nearby "Palm Beach" hotel.  This recently renovated hotel and casino 
complex stands at the edge of town on the seashore.  At a certain point, the pleasant walk 
along Famagusta's Palm Beach's shoreline is abruptly curtailed by a physical barrier clearly 
marked with “No Entry” signs. A quick look around reveals an eerie landscape that contrasts 
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starkly with the placid beach. Towering over the bathers in the clear turquoise water are 
large, crumbling, neglected and empty buildings that stretch several kilometers southwards 
(Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Palm Beach and Varosha with derelict buildings, 2010 (Photo: Author) 
The section of Palm Beach near Varosha (or Maraş in Turkish) district was once a 
vibrant and popular destination as well as a residential area primarily populated by Greek 
Cypriots. It was cleansed and left derelict after 1974. Unlike other locations in Northern 
Cyprus, Varosha was not repopulated with Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south or 
Turkish settlers from Anatolia. Sealed and barred from entry, Varosha is known today as "the 
ghost town" controlled solely by the Turkish military and under its direct jurisdiction.  
Varosha's encampment is but one, albeit conspicuous, example of the convoluted 
ways in which the domestication process, through which Northern Cyprus was formed, 
constantly intermingles with the material reality on the ground created by the initial 
encampment.  In the north there are several villages and parts of an urban built environment 
that have been converted into military bases to which civilians are denied access (Navaro-
Yashin, 2003; 2006; 2010; Demetriou, 2006). Yet, in Famagusta the effort to domesticate the 
encampment process is particularly noticeable as the only accessible beach, for both tourists 
and locals, is located directly outside Varosha. The rest of Famagusta's shoreline is under 
control of the Turkish military, which has rendered most of it inaccessible for security 
reasons (Kurum, 2012). Consequently, visitors to Famagusta are confronted with reality that 
is produced by the encampment and its continuing domestication.  
Much like Turkey, Israel has invested significant efforts into reshaping the Golan 
Heights as a tourist hub. Tourism was directly linked to the spatial encampment and 
domestication a mainly by using natural attractions such as Mount Hermon. The main reason 
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for occupying this mountain was its geo-strategic importance as the highest observation point 
in the area. However, the military and several governmental ministries created a joint 
governmental agency allowing private entrepreneurs to convert the mountain into a tourist 
site, entailing the demolition of the main Syrian village on the mountain's slopes and the 
construction of a ski resort (Ram, 2013).  
Indeed, Mount Hermon together with the rest of the Golan, became an attractive 
location for Israeli tourists. The number of visitors to the Golan increased from 150,000 in 
1968 to 500,000 during the 1970s, reaching approximately 1.5 million in 2005 (Avni & 
Petersburg, 2007).  Visitors are encouraged to spend a weekend in an area so they can "feel 
like being in Europe while remaining in Israel" (Maariv, 2001).   
One of the Golan's most popular sites is Tel Bental (Mount Bental).  Covered with 
snow from January through March, this inactive volcano provides a landscape relatively 
foreign to Israel's Middle Eastern climate.  A short drive up its winding road one finds 
oneself on a barren hilltop with a spectacular view of mountainous terrain, green meadows 
and secluded settlements neatly built yet scattered (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: View from the Ben Tal, 2007 (Photo: Author). 
 
However, looking more closely at Bental, this pastoral landscape reveals significant 
militaristic attributes. To the north stand the battlefields of the 1973 October war with ruined 
fortifications, deserted bunkers and live minefields. To the east, and not unlike Famagusta's 
Varosha, lies the ghost town of Kuneitra, formerly a Syrian town, today located in a no-man's 
land buffer zone. To the west, is Tel Avital, Bental’s geological twin, now a formidable army 
outpost.  Bental itself represents the hybrid nature of this region, for at its peak stands a 
Syrian outpost remodeled as an Israeli tourist attraction, merging the seemingly opposing 
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elements of battle and leisure, exception and norm. People can play war by freely roaming 
through its dugouts or by waging playful snowball "battles". For defense, one can also hide 
behind human scale images of soldiers posed in fighting positions which provide a constant 
sense of a state of war.  
 
Figure 3: Reconstructed bunker on the Bental, 2010 (Photo: Author). 
 
 
One could argue that the domestication dynamic thorough which the Golan is normalized, has 
rendered the Bental as a place which Rachel Woodward (2013: 43) defines as post-military 
landscapes: site without a military function in the present, but where the imprint of former 
military actions remain too pervasive to enable the erasure of their military origins. However 
it seems that the spatial contours of the Bental and the Golan Heights, as well as Varosha and 
Northern Cyprus, attests to a different situation which correlates with other colonial sites that 
have been encamped and domesticated (Teaiwa, 1994).   
In each case, space is rendered ordinary, an integral part of the everyday landscape of 
the state that incorporates it. Yet, the exception does not totally disappear, reminding the 
visitor of the space's "abnormal nature". This reminder is part of the way in which the 
occupation is justified and actually becomes part of the tourist attraction.  Thus, the state of 
emergency which provided the rationalization for a military occupation that was turned into a 
colonial conquest and executed through spatial encampment is maintained.  In other words, 
the state of exception that produced the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus constantly 
resurfaces, preventing both from becoming normal.  
 
Conclusion 
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In her discussion on imperial and colonial forms of dominance, Catherine Lutz explains that 
rather than a single coherent and accomplished enterprise, colonial conquests should be 
understood as a set of conflicting and only partially achieved projects (Lutz, 2006: 594). The 
Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus corroborate her insight not only because these territories 
are sites in which normalization is an everlasting project that cannot be completed, but also 
because both territories testify to the ways in which the effort to render encamped spaces as 
ordinary is continuously interrupted by a contrasting need to maintain the spatial attributes of 
the encampment.  
We saw that the condition of possibility for the occupation of the Golan Heights and 
Northern Cyprus was to present the territories as posing an external threat to the core state’s 
territory (which provided the reasoning for the military conquest) and that in order to deal 
with the threat the core states subsequently transformed the occupied area into an 
encampment. It is clear that spatial encampments can come in many forms. Their shape 
depends on their function and ultimate goals, while their materialization hinges on the 
practices which create them. In the cases at hand, and similar to other colonial settings, such 
as Guam or the Bikini Atoll, the act of encampment was based on extensive population 
removal and the destruction of indigenous spaces. Also the domestication processes which 
aimed at achieving different goals—in the Israeli case the objective was to incorporate the 
Golan into the state, while in the Turkish one the goal was to craft Northern Cyprus as a 
viable political proxy—operated in a similar way. They mitigated the exceptional means that 
were deployed in order to produce the normalcy of the space. In other words, they strove to 
transform the space that had been occupied because it posed an ostensible threat, as non-
threatening.  
However as Lutz has argued and as the two case studies show, encamped spaces can 
be normalized but cannot become normal. One example to the inherent inability of these 
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contested spaces to be perceived as normal relates to their function as tourist attractions, 
while maintaining their status as a possibly active warzones. The duality of each site as a 
tourist site and a battleground reminds the visitors that the area is not just a simple weekend 
resort but also a potential battlefield and as such it is an insecure location where vigilance 
should be maintained at all times. While this might undoubtedly attract some of the tourists 
who seek to experience the uniqueness of a domesticated encampment, it also means that the 
territories cannot simply become ordinary sites for visits and leisure.   
In a sense, the practices through which the domestication of each territory was 
conceived, such as exploration, quantification and spatial reconstruction and which also 
aimed at rendering a foreign presence in the contested space as normal – did not end up 
advancing the de-politicization and de-securitization of the occupation, but rather politicized 
it in a different way. Instead of negating the encampment's effect, the domestication practices 
actually preserved it thereby permitting the maintenance of a constant state of emergency 
which in turn means that the normalization effort cannot be completed. Thus, cases such as 
those described here demonstrate how processes of encampment and domestication lay bare 
their own weaknesses and points of contestation. This exemplifies, in turn, the ways in which 
sovereign violence produces its own vulnerability.  
The case studies shed light on another important issue that has not been adequately 
discussed in the literature. According to Schmittian analysis, the encampment precedes the 
norm and indeed shapes it. The state of exception, Schmitt argues, is superior to the norm as 
it cannot be codified in the existing legal order and thus is immanently unpredictable. But in 
this powerful capacity lies an inherent weakness, which Schmitt did not fully appreciate – the 
exception’s inability to exist without presupposing an ascribed normal state that must 
ultimately be restored. Put differently, the potency of the exception lies in its ability to 
suspend the norm rather than abolish it completely. Hence, the state of exception must be 
25 
 
defined through its juxtaposition with an ascribed normative state. In other words, not only is 
the exception crucial to the application of a norm, but a normal state is vital to the 
construction of the exception.  
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Notes
                                                           
1 Indeed, Guantanamo Bay has come to represent the quintessential model of the space of 
exception, especially as it presents the various obscurities arising from the relation 
between normal and exception. Simon Reid-Henry, for example, stresses the historical 
continuity in which Guantanamo Bay operates as a space of exception, elucidating its 
internal organizational balance between areas where the law is suspended and others 
where it is strictly abided (Reid-Henry, 2007). Nasser Hussain and Claudia Aradau 
have convincingly demonstrated the operation of normative law within Guantanamo 
Bay’s ostensible ambit of suspension, as well as the alteration of normative state 
jurisprudence to coincide with practices inside the camp (Hussain, 2007; Aradau, 
2007).  
2 For a discussion on the various forms of militarized landscapes see Woodward (2005). To 
one notable example on the ways in which structural violence is subsumed in the 
construction of imperial conquest and militarized landscape see (Loyd 2009). 
3 The Turkish military pressed to invade Cyprus twice, in 1964 and 1967 (O'Malley & Craig, 
2002: 128), yet a full scale incursion was thwarted by American pressure and reluctant 
civilian politicians in Turkey (Bolukbasi, 1993: 504; Adamson 2001: 286). Yet by 1974 
the United States and Britain believed that the partition of Cyprus between Turkey and 
Greece would serve their cold war interests (Fouskas 2005; Mallinson, 2007). 
4 Importantly, the use of violence was not limited to the Turkish military. Turkish Cypriots 
residing in the south were likewise incarcerated and fell victim to the unrestrained 
violence of Greek Cypriot forces. Thus, as Costas Constantinou (2008) suggests, 
Cyprus was caught in several states of exception that operated in tandem, reciprocating 
one another. Eventually, the mutual violence exerted on both sides of the island led to a 
population exchange agreement, signed on August 1975 (Hakkı, 2011: 80). By 1978, 
the number of Greek Cypriots living under Turkish rule had fallen from 20,000 to 500. 
Concurrently, 40,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south amassed in the north and 
joined the 71,000 Turkish Cypriots in the territory under Turkish control (Özsaray & 
Gürel, 2006: 3; Hatay, 2005: 14). 
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5 Spatial destruction of encamped spaces also literally lays the ground for the domestication 
efforts.  One example is Guam, where the destruction of 80 percent from the island's 
built environment during the Second World War, was followed by overall restructuring 
of the area's spatial attributes (Herman, 2008: 638). Another example is the Bikini Atoll 
which was almost laid to waist due to American nuclear testing and then restructured 
through various schemes such as afforestation and resettlement (Davis, 2005). 
6 Turkish Cypriot security forces, formed as a regular standing army and police force, were 
placed under the direct authority of the Turkish military commander. The director of 
the central bank is appointed by Turkey and is typically a Turkish citizen. The Turkish 
Lira was chosen as the official currency and is fixed with the same tariffs as in Turkey 
(Olgun, 1993a). A special committee was established within the Turkish embassy and 
charged with channeling funds from Turkey to local public projects with a budget 
amounting to US$3.07 billion between 1974 and 2004 (Sonan, 2007). The financial 
stream also helped inflate the Turkish Cypriot public sector, which since 1983 
comprises about 22% of the total work force. One interesting complaint regarding 
Turkey's intervention was heard from Turkish Cypriots who were trained in Turkey as 
civil servants that the program built for their professionalization was getting "more and 
more Turkish in style" (Dodd, 1993: 176).    
7 In 1981 Israel formally announced the application of civilian law over the Golan Heights; it 
was more a declarative act that corroborated the actual application of the law from the 
initial moment of the occupation (Rosental, 1969; Yishai, 1985).  
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